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Review Essay 
Ann Murphy, Violence and the Philosophical Imaginary 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2012) 
Erinn Gilson 
University of North Florida 
Ann Murphy’s Violence and the Philosophical Imaginary is a valuable 
contribution to ongoing discussions in contemporary Continental and 
feminist thought. Surveying the myriad ways the trope of violence appears 
in the thought of central figures in the Continental tradition and that of 
contemporary theorists influenced by their work, Murphy questions the 
meaning and implications of these images of violence. By her own account, 
the book is “a sort of ‘taking stock’” and a commencement of the process of 
working through the significance of the themes of violence and vulnerability 
that have become common in contemporary French thought (117). The book 
benefits from Murphy’s choice to address these issues thematically rather 
than exegetically; instead of proffering lengthy interpretations of Beauvoir, 
Derrida, Irigaray, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, or Sartre, she identifies themes 
whose treatment often invokes images of violence and seeks to highlight 
converging trends in recent work in feminist thought. The book is divided 
into two parts, the first of which most directly addresses the theme of 
violence as it pertains to the project of critique, the experience of shame, and 
the issue of identity, and the second of which addresses the related theme of 
vulnerability as it appears in a burgeoning contemporary literature. The 
topics are unified by a concern about the relationship between ontology and 
ethics, and the way tropes of violence and vulnerability appear at their 
intersection or traverse their increasingly blurred borders. Since Murphy’s 
intent is to raise questions and “think through what is at stake in the 
proliferation of these images” of violence (1), this review will briefly 
summarize some of her key insights, and then pose a few thoughts and 
questions that may allow us to continue the process of thinking through 
these vital issues. 
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In Chapter One, Murphy develops the central claim of the book: that 
images of violence serve an enormously significant function in the landscape 
of contemporary Continental philosophy. We can summarize their 
significance as comprising three interrelated dimensions. First, Murphy 
contends that these images are necessary “for the coherence of the theories” 
in which they are present; images of violence are not incidental to 
philosophical thought but rather central to it (13). Second, the distinctiveness 
of images of violence lies in the way they operate as founding tropes; as they 
appear in contemporary Continental philosophy, images of violence signal 
the inauguration of subjectivity and intersubjectivity, knowledge and 
representation, recognition and misrecognition, and so on. They appear at 
and characterize the transcendental level, and in this way straddle and cross 
the lines between metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, and ethics. Thus, 
Murphy maintains, the motif of violence not only shapes how we perceive 
and think about fundamental issues in contemporary Continental 
philosophy but, additionally, “is that which we now see through” (14). Thus, 
third, they have a productive dimension; images of violence are not mere 
recurring themes or alternate ways of representing core theoretical claims, 
but rather “generate a certain reality” (13), shaping and limiting what is and 
can be thought and how it is thought.1 
Despite their fundamental and indispensable role, the images of 
violence that suffuse philosophy are generally taken for granted, received as 
fascinating theoretical constructions and requisite background assumptions. 
Their pervasiveness renders them familiar and mundane, and thus they 
generally do not appear to us as problematic or worthy of question. Yet, 
their centrality and ubiquity are precisely why images of violence call for 
interrogation; if they are so essential to our critical philosophical endeavors, 
the reflexive nature of critique demands that we investigate their nature, 
roles, implications, and the meaning of their proliferation (3). In order to 
have a sense of where such images appear, Murphy highlights three distinct 
sites where images of violence predominate in the philosophical imaginary 
of contemporary Continental philosophy: first, in conceptions of subjectivity 
and identity, which are figured as being formed through necessary and 
constitutive exclusion; second, in accounts of knowledge and reason, which 
are imagined as appropriative operations through which alterity is 
possessed, assimilated, colonized, and thus reduced to sameness, its 
difference obliterated through the movement of consciousness; and, third, in 
the very notions of empathy that are intended to ameliorate violent 
exclusion but which have “come to be indicted as similarly violent” (20-22). 
Chapter Two turns to the question of what images of violence in 
philosophy tell us “about philosophy’s own self-understanding” (16). 
Murphy takes up Michèle Le Dœuff’s account of the relationship between 
the philosophical imaginary and shame in order to make the case that 
philosophy’s reliance on images of violence indicate a persistent uneasiness 
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with the body and finitude. Le Dœuff’s conception of the philosophical 
imaginary, most simply, refers to a set of common images that operate as an 
unintentional means of theoretical elaboration. Affectively, in shame, one 
wishes to flee because one has become aware of one’s failings and attendant 
responsibility, yet one is unable to flee and instead remains riveted to one’s 
self. On Murphy’s account, shame as a “theoretical mood” (27) arises 
because of philosophy’s anxiety about its own disciplinary borders and need 
to define itself by exclusion of “disciplinary others.” If, following Le Dœuff, 
the appearance of images in a philosophical text marks a site of evasion, 
then the images of violence that recur in the philosophical imaginary are 
signs of shame about philosophy’s own inability to reckon with finitude, the 
body, and its own disciplinary finiteness and contingency (the way in which 
philosophy becomes what it is only through the exclusion of its others, 
nonphilosophy). The discussion of shame and disciplinary exclusion raises 
one central and recurring question on Murphy’s account: what is at stake in 
endeavoring to contest, resist, or critique violence and oppression from the 
perspective of and with the theoretical tools of a discourse that finds itself 
complicit in violence in varying ways? In feminist theory, Murphy 
maintains, the bind of shame arises because we must work to counter 
violence on a theoretical terrain that has its own history of exclusions.2 
Shame, however, reveals to us that this violence is not inevitable but neither 
can it be wholly eradicated; rather it is that with which we must reckon.  
In Chapter Three, Murphy takes aim at the implications of violent 
imagery for our thinking of identity, especially as it is theorized in terms of 
visibility. Not only can violence be a consequence of both visibility and 
invisibility but, further, the concept of visibility can itself be utilized in a 
theoretically violent or exclusionary fashion. The focus of Murphy’s analysis 
is Linda Martín Alcoff’s Visible Identities (2006), which seeks to recuperate 
“identity” from critiques of identity politics that regard social group identity 
as balkanizing, unnecessary, and a hindrance to individual expression and 
freedom.3 While recognizing the ambivalence of visibility in Alcoff’s 
account, Murphy takes issue with the claim that race and gender are 
“‘paradigmatically visible’” because of its implications for those aspects of 
identity that are not deemed visible or visible enough (51). In particular, the 
focus on visibility is problematic when it comes to sexuality and queerness, 
which is figured both as hypervisible and as not visible enough in 
comparison to race and gender. This deployment of visibility results in 
ignorance of the material effects of homophobia, a suspicion of sexuality 
because of its purported lack of visibility, as well as an imperative to make 
desire and sexuality “‘become visible’” (58). Moreover, it enables us to 
overlook the way in which sexuality, sex, and gender (not to mention other 
significant axes of social identity) mutually constitute one another. Thus, 
Murphy concludes, prioritizing some dimensions of identity over others in 
virtue of their visibility “runs the risk of reinforcing certain kinds of violence 
(both the violence of objectification and the violence of nonrecognition)” 
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(61). Even in our critical engagement with the concept, visibility is a locus of 
violence because of what it precludes and excludes. 
The second part of the book, Chapters 4-6, turns to the concept of 
vulnerability, which has developed in tandem in Continental feminist 
thought4 with notions like dispossession, passivity, and exposure, and 
expresses an attempt to theorize “a nonappropriative or nonviolent relation 
with the other” (23). Throughout these three chapters, Murphy advances the 
argument that appeals made to the concept of vulnerability cannot be the 
basis for any ethical prescriptions but rather can only operate as 
provocations. Vulnerability is often understood as a transitional figure, one 
that leads from the ontological domain into the ethical and that is thought to 
generate particular ethical demands, including that of nonviolence. Murphy 
contests this move on a number of grounds (68): first, experiences of 
vulnerability often motivate retributive violence rather than leading to the 
desired nonviolent response; second, reference to vulnerability does not 
have any particular or substantive ethical or political implications; third, the 
idea of vulnerability may involve universalizing tendencies that render it 
uselessly abstract; and, fourth, a phenomenology of touch that highlights the 
fundamental nature of exposure to alterity (and so is an instance of the 
discourse of vulnerability) also lacks clear prescriptive content (see 75-79).  
Murphy elaborates the first and second of these points in relation to 
Judith Butler’s recent work; when Butler proposes that “staying with the 
thought of corporeal vulnerability” may facilitate nonviolence responses,5 
Murphy reminds us that “attending to one’s vulnerability can also promote 
all manner of violence” (74).6 We might, however, distinguish what Butler 
means by “attending” or “staying” or “tarrying with” from the kind of 
attention paid to vulnerability that usually precipitates violent response. 
Butler’s point is that the way in which many of us deal with vulnerability – 
and the vulnerability of loss and grief in particular – is precipitous; we do 
not want to experience vulnerability and so the experience of it induces us to 
do all we can in order not to experience it again. An uneasiness with the 
experience of vulnerability triggers reactive, defensive responses. To attend 
to the thought and experience of vulnerability is to attempt not to be so 
injudicious, so self-protective, and so inured in a position where one has the 
privilege of wielding force unilaterally and with little consequence.7 The 
intent behind the idea of “attending” to one’s vulnerability is to foster space 
in which one might see that it is possible to respond to the feeling of 
vulnerability with something besides violence. Here, though, Murphy’s 
second point of concern becomes especially salient and resonates strongly 
with the claims of the first three chapters: staying with the thought of 
vulnerability does not entail any particular ethical or political prescription, 
and, indeed, “it cannot do so in the absence of norms that would delineate 
how the realities of vulnerability are to be taken up politically, and these 
norms would themselves be injurious” (74). That is, if vulnerability “cannot 
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in and of itself yield an ethics” (68), then to derive any ethical content from 
this ontological feature is simply to impose an ethical norm and such a 
normative imposition would be another form of violence.  
 The fifth chapter explores the link between vulnerability and violence 
further via an examination of Adriana Cavarero’s ideas of horrorism and 
ontological altruism. Both concepts – of ontological vice and virtue, 
respectively – appeal to the unique embodied nature of human beings. The 
violence indicated by the term “horrorism” refers to an undoing of bodily 
integrity, to “the savaging of the body as a body” (97). The virtue of ontological 
altruism is founded on the fact that our uniqueness (both bodily, and 
expressed in speech and action) requires openness to others and “can only 
ever be recognized in plurality” (89). As the language of ontological vice and 
ontological virtue indicates, Cavarero’s work is a prime example of the 
complex move from the ontological to the ethical domain. Yet, Murphy 
notes, for Cavarero as for Butler, there is hesitation about the move from a 
claim about ontology – that life is precarious, that we are fundamentally 
vulnerable, exposed to others in a constitutive way, etc. – to an explicitly 
normative claim (91).  
The theme of hesitation recurs in the sixth chapter, which situates 
Simone de Beauvoir’s philosophy of ambiguity as a precursor to the 
contemporary discourses of violence and vulnerability. Beauvoir’s 
conception of ambiguity likewise straddles the ontological and ethical 
domains, and offers a nuanced account of the unavoidability of violence. It is 
with reference to Beauvoir’s existentialism that Murphy locates her own 
understanding of ethics on the post-Nietzschean, anti-foundationalist terrain 
to which it belongs. Ambiguity pervasively characterizes human existence; 
the simultaneity of our immanence and transcendence renders our condition 
ambiguous, as does the way in which our own actions exceed our capacity 
to control them, rendering us passive in relation to what we do. Failure thus 
lies at the heart of the human condition, but this failure is what makes ethics 
possible and necessary. The absence of a transcendent ground for ethical 
prescription means that “ethics are ‘ambiguous’” and  “always complicit in a 
kind of violence (104, 105). Consequently, Murphy endorses Beauvoir’s call 
to assume our ambiguity, which means first and foremost refusing to seek to 
transcend it, and in so doing recognizing the way all norms, modes of 
critique, and attempts at taking responsibility may very well do a form of 
violence even as they seek to work against it.   
Murphy’s meditations astutely point out that there is no “safe passage 
from the primordial vulnerability and exposure that constitutes the 
embodied subject to a model of justice wherein this ethical corporeity is 
universally respected” (74). In the spirit of thinking through these issues, 
however, we might question her assertion that the “retreat to vulnerability 
… does not readily conjure any particular ethical sensibility” or lead to any 
particular ethical ideal, and do so by reflecting on the rationale behind 
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developing the motif of vulnerability (75). As Murphy notes, the focus on 
vulnerability and its ambiguity in recent theory stems from a desire to think 
about ethical response as embodied, relationally constituted, and as inhering 
in the basic features of the human condition. In this way, there is a particular 
ethical sensibility drawn from a turn to vulnerability, one that is decidedly 
conducive to feminist work and that strongly contrasts with (and contests) 
the focus on de-contextualized principle, detached reasoning, and 
“disembedded and disembodied” selves that has characterized much of the 
history of ethical thought.8 Moreover, the turn to vulnerability, as Murphy’s 
discussion of ambiguity indicates, is a turn to a pervasive immanent 
condition in the wake of the dominance of ethical theories that postulate 
transcendent bases for claims about what we ought to do here and now. 
Thus, this turn is a way to root ethics in experience and the conditions for 
the possibility of experience, in specific experiences of instances of 
vulnerability (grief, loss, bodily dissolution, and the violence occasioning 
them) and in vulnerability as a generalized condition. Accordingly, the 
hesitation that Cavarero and Butler evince regarding the move from 
ontological to ethical might be understood as a hesitation about the force or 
nature of the prescription rather than about whether there is any prescriptive 
content to be mined from description of ontological features. They hesitate 
in language, stating that ethical prescription is “implied” rather than 
“entailed” (83) or cannot be “deduced” (91), because they have no recourse 
to a foundation that would enable prescriptive claims to be made with such 
certainty. In this way, the meditations on violence and vulnerability do the 
important work of shifting the focus of ethical concern away from 
justification (does feature “x” justify or ground prescription “y”?) and to the 
conditions that give rise to ethically salient action, feeling, and thought.9 In 
calling our attention to the irrevocably immanent terrain of ethics and 
politics, and in rooting ethics and politics on this terrain, the discourse of 
vulnerability enables us to consider ethics as a practice of problematizing 
actual ethical failure and success rather than one of postulating transcendent 
principles or their justificatory conditions.  
Indeed, the virtue of the discourse of vulnerability might be that it can 
entail nothing, can command nothing absolutely or necessarily, but rather 
requires acknowledgment of the impossibility of such entailment. Yet, 
vulnerability, in effect, forms the basis for any ethics whatsoever. If we are 
not vulnerable, we have no need for ethics, and it is because we are 
vulnerable that we feel any compulsion to respond ethically. Thus, when 
Murphy notes that “[t]his ontological condition [of ambivalent vulnerability] 
is one in which ethics finds its genesis, but it is one that no ethics can 
subsequently undo[,]” she is cautioning us not to consider an appeal to 
vulnerability as a panacea for ethical failure or promise of ethical adequacy 
(98). Indeed, if it contained such assurances, if it heralded such certainty, 
then there would be no need for an ethic. It is only because we can fail – and 
because this potential inheres in our vulnerable condition – that we can also 
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succeed.10 Thus, it is precisely because of the gap between ontology and 
ethics – the gap that indicates that no logically necessary deduction of ethical 
principles from ontological truths is possible – that responsibility is possible; 
it is, Murphy suggests, in hesitation that “responsibility is born” (98).  
 Yet, in another sense, the gap between ontology and ethics is no gap at 
all but just an instance of deeper ambiguity. Insofar as any description 
involves prescription, there is no move to be made from ontological 
description to ethical or political prescription because to describe is already 
to prescribe, albeit implicitly.11 Thus, while Murphy classifies Cavarero’s 
thought “as a descriptive account or a critical ontology [rather than] … a 
prescriptive or normative ethic,” she also identifies it as an “ethical 
ontology” that “emphasize[s] the intertwining of ethics and ontology” (92, 
99). An ethical ontology, however, would refuse to draw such a line between 
prescription and description because description also functions to create 
values. As Murphy notes, “the ethical decision emerges as a moment 
wherein values are constructed” and if values are constructed in description, 
then an ethical decision has been made there as well (114). Indeed, in many 
ways the premise of the book is that description possesses normative 
significance: the predominance of images of violence in our theoretical 
descriptions has normative implications and weight that warrants 
questioning. Thus, the question becomes one of the degree and extent of 
violence involved in the imposition of different kinds of norms. If our choice 
is between more or less conscious forms of violence – between positing 
norms and knowing that we posit them (and thus that they are contingent), 
on the one hand, and seeking to overcome ambiguity by positing an 
absolute foundation for norms (and thus remaining ignorant of their 
contingency and our role in their construction), on the other hand – then we 
ought to choose the violence of continual critique over the violence of an 
absolutism that precludes critique. If all prescriptions are violent, then those 
that command absolutely, with certainty and necessity are even more so. 
 Lastly, I think we need to return to Murphy’s central question: why 
has the motif of violence come to characterize so many and such diverse 
phenomena in contemporary Continental thought, and what are its 
implications? Whereas Murphy focuses on the unconscious significance of 
these images, we should also reflect on their theoretical purpose. Why do we 
characterize perception, language, subjectivity, intersubjectivity, norms, and 
more as “violent”? Why has the imagery of violence – something that seems 
paradigmatically subjective – come to characterize the pre-subjective, 
transcendental domain? What do we seek to convey through the use of this 
imagery? What does the trope of violence occlude? By using the language of 
violence to describe the formation of subjectivity, among other things, it 
seems that we attempt to convey a number of distinct ideas. First, that our 
selves are not shaped fully (or even mostly) consciously or in ways that are 
within our control, but rather we are brought into being through relations 
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that temporally precede and exceed us, and are beyond our control. Second, 
that there is a certain forcefulness (one that is not necessarily coercive) in our 
formation as selves; those norms that govern the use of language, structure 
how we perceive, and determine the categories through which we can 
understand ourselves are impressed upon us through social relations, and 
their strength or force derives from their pervasiveness and constitutive 
power. Third, that the formation of subjectivity involves exclusions, 
prohibitions, and foreclosures; certain paths are closed to us in advance, 
certain ways of being and those who exhibit them are barred and/or 
rejected. Although interrelated, these meanings are each distinct; each has a 
different importance and different consequences. None of them, however, is 
the functional equivalent to violence, although they certainly comprise 
necessary conditions for it, and treating them as if they are is imprecise to 
say the least.  
 What are the implications of repeated invocations of violence? And, 
moreover, what are the implications of employing the motif of violence in 
ways that might evoke the aforementioned meanings but fail to articulate 
them precisely and discern the differences between them? Murphy proposes 
that repeatedly discussing embodiment through images of violence might 
naturalize violence and this possibility is all the more likely when we render 
violence a transcendental, necessary condition (16). I wish to point out one 
other, perhaps more mundane, implication of this kind of language and 
imagery for the way we do philosophy. Tropes like “violence” seem to 
operate as a kind of convenient shorthand in contemporary Continental 
thought, referring to a whole literature and series of arguments, and 
standing in for explication of those ideas. In our unreflective recourse to 
such tropes, we avoid having to explain what we mean as well as having to 
explain it those who do not already know the shorthand. We make these 
references in the same way that philosophers in the analytic tradition name 
their problems (any cursory glance at the programs of the APA conferences 
will reveal this phenomenon) and by so naming them create a discourse that 
precludes understanding on the part of those who do not know this 
shorthand. Continental theorists, I suggest, use “violence,” among other 
things, in much the same way: as a catchall code that obviates the need to 
explicate fully the assumptions being made and the reasons for the 
terminology, that gets us out of thinking hard about its meaning, and that 
positions us as ‘in the know.’ For instance, when we speak of the violence of 
perception, we mean that perception is not the simple, neutral act of 
receiving sensory information but rather always involves an interpretive 
framework with its own implicit norms that shapes what we see and how 
we see it. To say simply that perception is violent, though, fails to engage in 
the important intellectual work of discerning both how exactly it might be 
said to be “violent” (Does it induce material violence? Does the experience 
of being seen in certain contexts approximate a physical blow?) and what the 
pitfalls of such linguistic innovation might be. It also limits our discourse to 
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those who understand the reference. Such a move closes off our 
conversations, making them more narrow and provincial.  
The intent of Violence and the Philosophical Imaginary is to open up our 
conversations by prompting us to think reflexively about what we do when 
we engage in philosophical critique and raising a variety of quite pressing 
questions to facilitate this critical work. Thus, it is fitting that the book offers 
more questions than it does answers. I hope it will prompt a much needed 
discussion about why we do philosophy in the ways that we do, why certain 
tropes and images appeal and dominate the philosophical terrain, what their 
implications are, and what we as thinkers ought to do with them, through 
them or in light of them. In particular, I hope others will pick up the threads 
Ann Murphy has unwoven for us and explore why the motif of violence 
might have particular efficacy, whether there are any good reasons to retain 
it in its multiple forms, or whether the force of the term is diluted by its 
unrestrained, almost promiscuous, use. It is always a good sign when a book 
opens many avenues for future reflection and work, and Violence and the 
Philosophical Imaginary does just that. 
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pernicious consequence of naturalizing them (191). 
 
1 8 2  |  R e v i e w  E s s a y  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXI, No 1 (2013)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2013.591 
 
4 In addition to the work of Judith Butler and Adriana Cavarero, see Debra 
Bergoffen, Contesting the Politics of Genocidal Rape (New York: Routledge, 2011); 
Rosalyn Diprose, Corporeal Generosity (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2002); Lisa 
Guenther, The Gift of the Other (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2006); Kelly Oliver, 
Women as Weapons of War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).  
5 Judith Butler, Precarious Life (New York: Verso, 2004), 29. 
6 Murphy goes on to note that Butler’s understanding of the ethical demand that 
may be inherent in vulnerability shifts slightly in her more recent Frames of War; 
here Butler emphasizes more strongly the differential distribution of precariousness 
(termed precarity) and calls “for greater attentiveness to this differential allocation 
of vulnerability and the mechanism that both produce and veil this inequities” 
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